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PAULJ. HEALD
THE VICES OF ORIGINALITY
Lately, the Constitution has become an unwelcome guest at the
parties of those claiming rights lying on the periphery of intellec-
tual property. Two terms ago, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft
Boats Inc.,' the Court held that federal patent law preempted a
Florida statute forbidding the reproduction of boat hulls by use of
any direct molding process. The Court's decision effectively pro-
vided a limited constitutional right to copy unpatented product
shapes and designs.I Most recently, in Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural
Telephone Service, Inc.3 the Intellectual Property Clause4 was held to
create positive restraints on Congress's ability to provide copyright
protection. In deciding that telephone directory white pages were
uncopyrightable, the Court found that the Intellectual Property
Clause imposed an originality requirement on authors seeking pro-
tection for their works. It held that Rural Telephone Service's
white pages were not original enough to meet the new constitu-
Paul J. Heald is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
AutHOR's NoTE: Thanks to Doug Baird, Richard Craswell, Craig Joyce, Ray Patterson,
Jim Smith, and Michael Wells for insightful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors are
undoubtedly theirs.
489 US 141 (1989).
2 This right must be termed "limited" for two reasons. First, since the decision was based
on the finding of a conflict between the state antimolding statute and the current federal
patent statute, amendments to the federal statute might change its preemptive contours.
Second, the copying privilege must be exercised with due regard for relevant prohibitions
contained in federal trademark law. See Paul J. Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and
the Economics of Preemption, 76 Iowa L Rev - (1991).
3 111 S Ct 1282 (1991).
' US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8 (Congress shall have the power "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
© 1992 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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tional requirement. The Intellectual Property Clause, generally
presumed to be nothing more than a grant of power to Congress,
5
suddenly grew some substantive claws.
The idea that only "original" works can be copyrighted is hardly
novel. The 1976 Copyright Act6 protects only "original works of
authorship," as did its predecessor act as interpreted by courts and
commentators.7 Exactly what "original" meant in a work comprised
of a compilation of facts was hotly debated. A unanimous Court
in Feist dropped two bombshells in the middle of the debate. First,
Justice O'Connor's opinion asserts, bludgeoning the point home
in at least seven places, that originality exists as a constitutional
requirement wholly apart from the Copyright Act.' Second, tele-
phone white pages are not original enough to satisfy the new consti-
tutional test. In other words, the familiar white pages are unpro-
tected and Congress apparently can do nothing to render them
protectable short of initiating a constitutional amendment.
The opinion is all the more interesting, because the Court by-
passed at least four narrower grounds for reversing the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision-the well-worn axiom militating against reaching
constitutional questions except when necessary was nowhere to be
seen. Doctrinally, these narrow grounds appear far more attractive
than the rationale provided in Justice O'Connor's opinion. Feist's
constitutionalization of the originality requirement is undesirable
because it may frustrate the goals of the Intellectual Property
Clause, as described by virtually all modern commentators and the
Court itself. Although the likely contours of the post-Feist legal
landscape are difficult to predict, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Feist has direct implications for the copyrightability of other types
of statutory compilations, collections of facts found in noncompil-
ations, and other works which evidence little originality such as
maps and some computer programs. The opinion may also affect
the copyrightability of broadcasts of sporting events and speeches,
and raises the question of the legitimacy of a congressional attempt
' See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, I Nimmer on Copyight § 1.02 at 1-30 (1990)
(hereinafter "Nimmer").
6 17 USC §§ 101 et seq (1976).
See Goldstein v Calfornia, 412 US 546, 561 (1973); Feist, 111 S Ct at 1290, citingBurrow-
Giles v Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884).
8 See Feist, 111 S Ct at 1288, 1289, 1296, & 1297.
[1991
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to circumvent the decision by enacting legislation under its power
to regulate interstate commerce.
I. THE OPINION AND ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS
The defendant in Feist produced a comprehensive white
pages directory covering eleven different telephone service areas
in northwest Kansas. It obtained permission from ten of eleven
telephone companies to use their local listings to create an all-
encompassing directory containing 47,000 alphabetically ordered
listings. When Rural Telephone Service refused to grant permis-
sion to allow copying of any of its 7,700 listings, Feist used 1,309
of them anyway. Rural then brought suit in federal district court
for copyright infringement, prevailing on a motion for summary
judgment. 9 Later, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in a short unpub-
lished per curiam opinion.l° Both lower courts relied on consistent
authority that white pages directories were copyrightable." Since
Feist readily admitted to copying some of Rural's listings, the lower
courts had little problem finding Feist liable on the basis of prece-
dent broadly protecting those who invest time and labor in the
creation of factual compilations.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this line of lower court
cases by holding that telephone white pages are not "original," and
therefore not copyrightable at all. The Court noted that cases find-
ing white pages entitled to protection were based on the "sweat of
the brow"/"industrious collection" theory 2 that rewards an author
for her labor and not for her originality. After discussing the re-
quirement of originality, the Court ruled that it was not met by
showing that a great deal of labor and expense went into creating
the work. Some degree of truly original expression must be
present.
9 663 F Supp 214 (D Kan 1987).
10 916 F2d 718 (10th Cir 1990).
t See, for example, Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v Haines & Co., 905 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990),
vacated 111 S Ct 1408 (1991); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F2d 128 (8th
Cir 1985); Leon v Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F2d 484 (9th Cir 1937); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v Nationwide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 371 F Supp 900 (WD Ark 1974).
12 See Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F 83, 88 (2d Cir 1922)
('The right to copyright ... does not depend upon... originality, either in thought or
language, or anything more than industrious collection").
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In the case of factual compilations, the Court stated that a modi-
cum of originality as to selection, coordination, and arrangement
would suffice to render most factual compilations copyrightable.
However, the copyright so obtained would only extend to the se-
lection, coordination, and arrangement-the facts themselves
would fall in the public domain. Moreover, the Court found that
alphabetized telephone white pages lacked the modicum of original-
ity as to selection, coordination, and arrangement.
Most surprising was the Court's willingness to rely on constitu-
tional rather than statutory grounds. Several nonconstitutional
grounds are readily available. Obviously, the decision could have
relied on the originality requirement found in the Copyright Act.13
As several commentators and the Court have noted, the "sweat of
the brow" theory is not easily teased out of the statutory language.'
4
Without even mentioning the Constitution, the Court could have
given as the sole basis for decision (it did only in passing) that the
telephone white pages are not "original works of authorship"15 in
the language of the Act. Although the bottom line of such an
opinion would have been the same as the one actually written-
telephone white pages are wholly unprotected-Congress could
have responded by amending the statute.
Alternatively, the Court could have held that the labor involved
in collecting facts such as those found in telephone white pages did
confer a sort of originality to the work. Such a finding of copyright-
able through sweat, however, would not necessarily have resulted
in a finding of copyright infringement on the facts of Feist. First,
copyright law normally requires a finding of "substantial similar-
ity" between the original and infringing works.' 6 Given that Feist's
unified directory of 47,000 names and addresses covering 11 tele-
phone districts employed in scattered fashion only 1,309 of Rural's
listings, the Court could have held that the activity engaged in by
13 See 17 USC § 102(a).
4 See William Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the "White Pages" are not
Copyrightable), 12 Comm & L 37, 45-59 (1990); L. Ray Patterson & CraigJoyce, Monopolizing
the Law: The Scope of Copyrigbt Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA
L Rev 719, 757-77 (1989). Both articles were relied upon by the Court in Feist.
" 17 USC §§ 101 & 102.
16 See Nimmer, 3 Nimmer § 13.03[A] at 13-23 (cited in note 5).
[1991
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Feist was not actionable copying. The two works simply were not
similar as a matter of law.
Third, the Court could have held that although Rural's white
pages were copyrightable, Feist's independent checking of the in-
formation culled from Rural's work added enough of its own sweat
to justify its "copying." Feist did not merely copy Rural's listings
and print them as its own. Feist's investigators independently veri-
fied data culled from Rural's directory; as a result, Feist's listings
often had the street addresses of Rural's subscribers while Rural's
own listings did not. Feist worked hard and created a truly new
and different work. Sanctioning its behavior by a finding of nonin-
fringing use would arguably have advanced the statutory goal of
encouraging new creations.
Finally, the Court could have resorted to the fair use doctrine. 
17
The only material Feist took from Rural's white pages were raw
facts which were themselves uncopyrightable."8 Use of facts has
traditionally been considered to be a fair use. Perhaps photocopy-
ing Rural's white pages and distributing them should be infringe-
ment (it is not under the Court's opinion as written), but merely
using them as a reference work could easily suffice as fair use under
section 107 of the Copyright Act.
However, rather than adopt any of these alternatives, the Court
chose to rely on an interpretation of the originality requirement
implicit in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution. In
holding that originality as a constitutional matter did not include
a "sweat of the brow" component, the court harkened back over a
hundred years to Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony19 and the
Trade-Mark Cases."0 Neither decision compels (or forbids) the
Court's approach in Feist. In considering the definition of "author"
in the Intellectual Property Clause, the Burrow-Giles court found
that copyright is meant to protect "original intellectual conceptions
of the author."21 It held that a carefully posed and artful studio
" See 17 USC § 107 ('the fair use of a copyrighted work... is not an infringement of
copyright").
S See 17 USC § 102(b).
111 US 53 (1884).
20 100 US 82 (1879).
S111 US at 58.
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portrait of Oscar Wilde was original enough to be copyrighted.22
However, after considering the copyrightability of mere "ordinary"
pictures where the photographer's art was less apparent, the Court
succinctly commented, "On the question as thus stated we decide
nothing."23 The decision therefore provided no minimum baseline
for its requirement of "original intellectual conception" and clearly
passed on the opportunity to declare purely mimetic works of im-
age reproduction unoriginal and uncopyrightable.
In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court struck down a nineteenth-
century predecessor24 to the Lanham Trademark Act 25 as unautho-
rized by either the Intellectual Property Clause or the Commerce
Clause. In finding the Intellectual Property Clause an inappropriate
source of congressional power, the Court held that trademarks are
not works of authorship. 26 Trademarks were not found to be inde-
pendent creations, "original ... founded in the creative powers of
the mind [or] ... the fruits of intellectual labor."27 This language is
a bit more helpful. It at least tells us that trademarks are not original
enough to merit protection under the Intellectual Property Clause.
A trademark, the Court explained, "is the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using
it."'28 Trademarks embody the goodwill of a business or product:29
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to investiga-
tion or discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common
22 The trial court had found as a matter of fact that the photo was a "useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the same .. .
entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies,
and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made en-
tirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit." Id at 60.
23 Id at 59.
24 19 Stat 141 (1876).
25 15 USC §§ 1051 et seq (providing for the registration of trademarks and remedies for
their infringement).
26 Remember the Intellectual Property Clause refers to advancing the useful arts by re-
warding "authors."
27 100 US at 94.
28 Id. The Court seemed to have only trade symbols in mind when it discussed the
originality requirement, for example, the red triangle trademark of Bass Ale, reputedly the
oldest registered trademark in England. See inscription on bottle of Bass Ale on file in
author's refrigerator.
29 Id.
[1991
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law is generally the growth of a considerable period of use,
rather than a sudden invention ... [a]t common law the exclu-
sive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.
Since the statute only authorized the registration of common law
trademarks, what it sought to protect was something that attained
its value through use, not through inspiration or laborious creation.
A trademark becomes valuable when connected to a product in
consumers' minds. The law aimed to protect the efforts of business-
men at promoting their goods-their efforts to develop good will,
not their efforts to create interesting trademarks. The law was not
proposed to stimulate the creation of interesting and original marks.
The overtly commercial purposes of the Trade-Mark Act were
ill-fitted to the creative goals of the Intellectual Property Clause.
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis in Feist does little to tell us
why the telephone white pages resemble common-law trademarks.
Applying copyright protection to some compilations might stimu-
late the "investigation or discovery" of works that may be valuable
in and of themselves, unlike trademarks that have no value apart
from products or businesses independently developed and pro-
moted. The Trade-Mark Cases do tell us that the Constitution re-
quires originality as a prerequisite to copyright protection; how-
ever, it does little to dispel the possibility that creations owing their
existence to perspiration rather than inspiration might conceivably
be defined as "original"3 in order to advance the wealth-maxim-
izing goals of the Intellectual Property Clause discussed below.
II. THE UNDESIRABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE
ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT
A. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF FACTUAL WORKS
Works consisting primarily of facts, such as the white pages
directory at issue in Feist, have traditionally posed the thorniest
copyright problems for the courts. Copyright law is supposed to
stimulate creation, but facts are not "created." They already exist;
therefore, one could conclude that primarily factual (low author-
30 See Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F 83 (2d Cir 1922) (defining
originality in terms of "industrious collection").
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ship)31 works should be utterly unprotected. However, what about
facts that beg to be uncovered, collected, arranged, and made avail-
able to a needy public? Shouldn't the copyright system extend to
provide proper incentives for their creation? The short answer is
that it always has to varying degrees. The first copyright statute,
enacted in 1790 by the first Congress, provided copyright protec-
tion for "any map, chart, book or books."32 Maps are perhaps the
quintessential factual work." The closer a map depicts a precise
physical reality, the better it is. Maps are protected under the
current copyright statute, as are compilations of "preexisting mate-
rials." 34
However, works of low authorship, including maps, have re-
ceived inconsistent protection from copying. Some courts, sensitive
to the danger of upholding claims that would take facts and ideas
from the public domain, have allowed extensive copying. Other
courts, sensitive to the need to protect expenditures of resources
in developing valuable works of low authorship, have extended
broad protection. The result has been chaotic. Courts have privi-
leged some directories that appropriate large amounts of data from
existing directories, while condemning others.3" Some mapmakers
have successfully based new maps directly from old ones, others
have not.36 Moviemakers are sometimes, but not always, privileged
to borrow plots and storylines from books or plays.37 Some sorts
of information may be gleaned from published lists and tables,
3 Professor Ginsburg has helpfully denominated primarily factual works (for example,
factual compilations, maps, etc.) as those of "low authorship" and primarily fictive works
(for example, novels, poetry, etc.) as those of "high authorship." I will use her terminology
here. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection for Works of
Information, 90 Colum L Rev 1865, 1866 (1990).
32 Act of May 31, 1790, ch 15, §, I Stat 124.
" Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
Harv L Rev 1569, 1571-76 (1962).
14 17 USC § 103.
" Compare New York Times Co. v Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F Supp 217 (D NJ
1977), with Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v Haines & Co., 905 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990) (vacated in
light of Feist, see 111 S Ct 1408 (1991)), and Leon v Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F2d 484 (9th
Cir 1937).
36 Compare Amsterdam v Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F2d 104 (3d Cir 1951), with Rock-
ford Map Publisbers Inc. v Directory Serv. Co., 768 F2d 145 (7th Cir 1985), and United States
v Hamilton, 583 F2d 448 (9th Cir 1978).
" Compare Miller v Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F2d 1365 (5th Cir 1981), with Sheldon
v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F2d 49 (2d Cir 1936) (aff'd 309 US 390 (1940)), and
Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir 1930).
[1991
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while virtually indistinguishable information is privileged.38
Prints39 and biographies'" have suffered similar seemingly random
fates.
In a recent article, Professor John Wiley proposes an imaginative
explanation to illustrate this confused state of copyright jurispru-
dence as related to the protection of facts, ideas, and expressions.
He blames the opaque state of the law on Duncan Kennedy travel-
ing backward in time to plant the seeds of a subversive plant of
copyright indeterminacy which would grow to be "discovered" by
his CLS followers decades later.4 Indeed, the body of law concern-
ing the scope of copyright protection afforded works of "low au-
thorship" at issue in Feist is a morass of elusive and manipulable
doctrine and counterdoctrine.
Several indeterminate yet widely accepted doctrines govern dis-
putes involving the copyrightability of materials containing primar-
ily facts. The idea/expression and fact/expression dichotomies
teach that the particular expression of ideas and facts, but not the
ideas and facts themselves, are copyrightable.42 The merger doc-
trine tells us that when ideas or facts must inevitably be expressed
in a particular manner, content and form are said to "merge" ren-
dering the expression itself unprotected. 43 As noted above, the orig-
inality requirement requires that a copyrighted work be, well, orig-
inal.44 Further explanation of these governing "principles" need not
be discussed in detail because they are essentially indeterminate
and contentless. 45 They can be defined and discussed in the ab-
18 Compare Financial Information Inc. v Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F2d 204 (2d Cir 1986),
with Eckes v Card Prices Update, 736 F2d 859 (2d Cir 1984), and National Business Lists Inc. v
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F Supp 89 (ND l1 1982).
" Compare Gracen v Bradford Exchange, 698 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1983), with Alfred Bell &
Co., Ltd. v Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F2d 99 (2d Cir 1951).
" Compare Toksvig v Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F2d 664 (7th Cir 1950), with Rosemont
Enterprises v Random House, Inc., 366 F2d 303 (2d Cir 1966).
41John S. Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U Chi L Rev 119, 126 (1991).
4 See Feist, 111 S Ct at 1290; United Video v FCC, 890 F2d 1173, 1191 (DC 1989).
'3 See Shaw v Lindheim, 919 F2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir 1990).
1 See Feist, 111 S Ct at 1294 (a work must "display some minimal level of creativity").
41 For a sample of the voluminous criticism of these doctrines see Wiley, 58 U Chi L Rev
at 120-27 (cited in note 41); Ginsburg, 90 Colum L Rev at 1913-16, 1927 (cited in note
31); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965, 968, 1012 (1990); Gorman, 76
Harv L Rev at 1570 & 1572 (cited in note 33); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections
of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum L Rev 516 (1981);
Nichols v Universal Pictures Studio Corp, 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir 1930) (Hand, J.).
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stract, but they fail to generate consistent results in like cases. 46
Saying that only original expressions, but never facts or ideas,
are copyrightable proves to be far easier than applying the notion
consistently and coherently. Although commentators and the
courts generally agree that the purpose of copyright law as a whole
is to establish incentives for the creation of works which because
of their public goods aspects might otherwise go uncreated,47 the
rules supposedly advancing that uncontroversial goal are incoher-
ent. Interestingly, the cases themselves demonstrate a keen aware-
ness of the haphazard nature of the results, "Obviously, no princi-
ple can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying
the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must there-
fore inevitably be ad hoc." 48
The cases undeniably fail to articulate a rationale that helps re-
solve the tension inherent in the controversies. The tension arises
due to the dual needs to maintain public access to important facts
and to stimulate the discovery and publication of those facts
through the grant of exclusive rights. A broad doctrine such as the
idea/expression dichotomy recognizes the tension, but provides no
clue as to how the balance should tip in a particular case.
B. RECONSTRUCTING COPYRIGHT LAW
The problems inherent in evaluating the copyrightability of low
authorship works has stimulated several interesting proposed solu-
tions worthy of very brief summary to illustrate the unsatisfactory
nature of the Court's approach in Feist. Professor Wiley has sug-
gested that copyright law has much to learn from patent law. He
argues for a functional approach to defining the originality of and
therefore the protectability of works of low authorship: "Copyright
courts, then, should define as original any work whose creation
requires enough effort to deter the creative act absent the copy-
right's exclusive promise."'49 If this results in the protection of
'6 See notes 35-40.
" See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, AnEconomicAnalysisofCopyrigbt
Law, 18 J L Stud 325 (1989); Wiley (cited in note 41); Litman (cited in note 45); Ginsburg
(cited in note 31); Denicola (cited in note 45); Gorman (cited in note 33). See also Mazer v
Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954); Sony Corp. v Universal Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 429 (1984).
" Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F2d 487, 489 (2d Cir 1960) (Hand,
J.).
4 Wiley, 58 U Chi L Rev at 148 (cited in note 41).
[1991
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works more the result of their authors' labor and research than
their personalities, so be it-as long as the public receives in return
a creation it otherwise would not have.
Professor Ginsburg offers the "high authorship"/"low author-
ship"50 distinction and argues that two different sets of rules should
govern her categories. She contends that protecting low authorship
works from any substantial borrowing would diminish the net in-
formation available to society, while the absence of protection for
low authorship works would not provide adequate incentives for
their creation. She concludes that a compulsory licensing scheme
for low authorship works would create the most efficient set of
incentives. Professors Patterson and Joyce disagree, believing that
works of low authorship are probably overprotected. In an influen-
tial article5 1 criticizing the important West Publishings2 case, they
assert that any protection afforded the pagination of West's Na-
tional Reporter System volumes "turns copyright law upside down:
it inhibits the promotion of learning by taking public domain mate-
rials which have no author and subjecting them to the monopoly
of copyright.""
Professor Litman is also concerned with nurturing the public
domain. Like Wiley, she views the originality requirement as "an
apparition [that] cannot provide a basis for deciding copyright
cases." 54 She argues forcefully that most works are unoriginal in
any real sense. Even works of so-called "high authorship" are full
of stock characters, scenes, themes, and motifs that have long been
part of our rich public domain. She redefines the notion of original-
ity to better "reserv[e] the raw material of authorship to the com-
mons. '55 On the other hand, Professors Denicolas6 and Gorman"
are less concerned about the public domain and more concerned
with rewarding the industrious efforts of authors who create pri-
s See note 31.
s' See Patterson & Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev 719 (cited in note 14). The Court's opinion
in Feist cites the article on five occasions.
52 West Publishing Co. v Mead Data Central Inc., 799 F2d 1219 (8th Cir 1986).
53 Patterson &Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev at 810 (cited in note 14).
54 Litman, 39 Emory LJ at 1023 (cited in note 45).
55 Id.
56 See Denicola, 81 Colum L Rev 516 (cited in note 45).
57 See Gorman, 76 Harv L Rev 1569 (cited in note 33).
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marily factual works: histories, biographies, and news of the day,
as well as maps, directories, and forms. They fear the misapplica-
tion of copyright doctrine would result in seriously diminished
incentives for creation.
On the other extreme is former professor, now First Circuit
Judge, Stephen Breyer. 8 He is skeptical about the notion of copy-
right in general. He would agree with Professor Wiley that protec-
tion should be provided when it results in the creation of a work
that otherwise would go uncreated. However, he is not convinced
as an empirical matter that many such potential works need the
prodding of the copyright monopoly. 9 He occupies the far fringe
of the antiprotectionist position.
Although commentators disagree on precisely how to reform
copyright law, they all agree that copyright law is a complex sys-
tem of incentives designed to advance knowledge and therefore the
public welfare. Contrary to frequent assertions by the publishing
industry, copyright is not a natural law right of the author 6 0-it
exists as positive law "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts. ''61 And it does so by establishing a balance between the mo-
nopoly costs of the copyright grant and the benefits of creations
stimulated thereby.62 They all tend to see the balance as out of
whack due the incoherence of the originality requirement and the
idea/expression dichotomy. They disagree on whether the current
confusion results in too little or too much protection for works of
low authorship; however, the goal of reform seems to be the same:
maximize public welfare through a coherent system of incentives.
This is, of course, more easily said than done. As Breyer pointed
out twenty years ago, the question of the proper scope of copyright
protection is primarily empirical and difficult to quantify.63 In the
absence of convincing studies, it is unclear whether the courts
" Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281 (1970).
'9 Id at 351.
0 At least one recent commentator makes rights-based arguments, however. See Alfred
C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St L J 517 (1990).
61 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
2 The most formal presentation of the theory is found in Landes & Posner, 18 J Legal
Stud at 333-44 (cited in note 47).
63 Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 351 (cited in note 58).
[1991
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should be left to continue to forge a: common law of copyright
within the wide interstices of the Copyright Act or whether Con-
gress should step in and try to legislate the efficient answer. The
fact situation in Feist provides a good hypothetical: To what extent
should telephone white pages be protected from copying? Most
commentators agree that the correct answer would be: "To the
extent necessary to maximize public welfare." The discussion
would then center around what that answer necessitates: no protec-
tion; protection only from competing uses; protection only from
substantially similar uses; protection from all uses. Of course, the
lack of empirical evidence would allow for a wide diversity of opin-
ion. Focusing on public welfare hardly guarantees correct answers
in the absence of convincing empirical evidence. But it is at least
the proper focus.
C. THE STRANGE ROAD TAKEN
On the surface, Feist recognizes the welfare goals of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause. As she did in Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder
Craft Boats Inc.,' Justice O'Connor asserts the primacy of the pub-
lic interest as the basis for creating rights to intellectual property.
She reaffirms the notion expressed in Wheaton v Peters65 that copy-
right is a statutory grant of limited power, not a recognition of the
natural law right of the author. This acknowledgment is crucial to
any reform. In Feist and Bonito Boats, Justice O'Connor may have
the Court pointed in the right direction-the public will almost
certainly, benefit from the copying blessed by the two cases. In
fact, we may be seeing the dawning of a new era of "user's rights."
However, the Feist decision prevents Congress from focusing di-
rectly on the public welfare question when it considers copyrights
for works of low authorship formerly protected under the "sweat
of the brow"/"industrious collection" doctrine.
In handcuffing Congress with a version of the originality require-
ment that absolutely forbids protection based on the value of an
author's research or labor, the Court clearly rejected the "sweat of
the brow"/"industrious collection" rationale for protection:
66
64 489 US 141 (1989).
65 8 Peters 591 (1834).
66Feist, I IIS Ct at 1291-92.
HeinOnline -- 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 155 1991
156 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine had numerous flaws, the
most glaring being that it extended copyright protection in a
compilation beyond selection and arrangement-the compiler's
original contribution-to the facts themselves . . . "[s]weat of
the brow" courts thereby eschewed the most fundamental
axiom of copyright law-that no one may copyright facts or
ideas . . . [w]ithout a doubt, the "sweat of the brow" doctrine
flouted basic copyright principles.
As stated earlier, a strong argument can be made that under the
current copyright statute, the Court is correct. Section 103 states
that factual compilations are copyrightable, but "factual compila-
tion" is defined as a work "selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship."67 The statute can plausibly be read to exclude
completely protection of any factual information contained in a
work. Whether the Constitution mandates such a result, however,
is less clear.
The constitutional question can be posed by a brief examination
of two appellate cases, the first of which, Miller v Universal City
Studios,6" the Court relied on in Feist. In Miller, the plaintiff coau-
thored a book with the victim of a bizarre Georgia kidnapping.
After Universal, drawing heavily on the book as a reference, made
a television motion picture about the crime, Miller sued for copy-
right infringement alleging that Universal had appropriated many
of the details uncovered in his research. The Fifth Circuit reversed
a jury verdict for Miller, holding that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that the Copyright Act protected Miller's re-
search as opposed to merely its literal expression. The Fifth Circuit
rejected the sweat of the brow rationale, reasoning that no amount
of labor in and of itself was sufficient to confer copyright pro-
tection.
Does the Constitution mandate the same result? The Intellectual
Property Clause suggests that the inquiry should center on whether
providing copyright protection would advance the public welfare.
In other words, would Miller have created the work in the absence
of protection against the sort of behavior engaged in by Universal?
67 17 USC § 101.
6' 650 F2d 1365 (5th Cir 1981), discussed in Feist, 111 S Ct at 1288-89, 1291, 1295.
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Let's assume the answer is yes.69 After all, Miller's research con-
sisted primarily in interviewing his coauthor about her
experiences-not an overly burdensome or expensive task. In addi-
tion, Universal's film did not directly compete with Miller's book.
Book sales were probably not adversely affected.7 ' Although it has
been argued that an author's right to produce derivative works
provides a marginal creative stimulus, 71 it would seem unlikely that
Miller's book would have gone unwritten due to the fear that an
unauthorized film will appear.
One can imagine, however, a case where a disincentive to borrow
factual information might be necessary to stimulate creative activ-
ity. In Toksvig v Bruce Publishing Co.,72 the plaintiff traveled to
Europe to collect and translate original sources relevant to her biog-
raphy of the life of Hans Christian Andersen. Much of the informa-
tion presented in the biography was a direct result the plaintiff's
time, labor, expense, and fluency in Danish.73 After the plaintiff's
biography was published, defendant published a biography of An-
dersen which drew broadly from plaintiff's work. The Seventh
Circuit held that the subsequent biographer had infringed plain-
tiff's copyright. The facts of Toksvig provide a better ground upon
which to argue that protection was necessary to stimulate creation.
69 And let's also assume, as the framers of the Constitution apparently did, that encourag-
ing authors to create artistic works tends to advance the public welfare. In other words, we
assume that Miller would not have discovered a cure for cancer had he not been writing his
book. Technically, the public welfare should be measured by taking the dfference between
the social utility of the authored work and the social utility of the other opportunities of the
author. In other words, a work should be copyrightable only if necessary to encourage the
work and the work is more socially useful than whatever else the writer would choose to
do, for example, child rearing or brickmasonry. Unfortunately, the ramifications of this
insight into the marginal utility of creativity in the copyright context have never been fully
explored and will not be so here. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 37 (3d ed
1986) (noting in the patent context that "[tihe costs of the patent system include... inducing
potentially excessive investment in inventing"); Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and
Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53 Antitrust L J 503, 507 (1984)
(patent law "may lead to excessive investment in the creation of intellectual and industrial
property").
7' The movie even may have stimulated sales to those wanting to learn more about the
crime. Of course, others, having seen the movie, may not have wanted to buy the book.
7' See Landes & Posner, 18 J Legal Stud 353-57 (cited in note 47).
72 181 F2d 664 (7th Cir 1950).
'3 As any person fluent in a foreign language can attest, language acquisition represents
a substantial investment in resources. Of course, writing the biography was not the plain-
tiff's sole motivation for learning Danish.
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The plaintiff may very well have eschewed the travel, time, ex-
pense, and labor involved in researching the book in the absence
of the certain ability to reap the full profit of her labor. Affording
protection to the sort of research engaged in by Toksvig may very
well increase public welfare.
The Toksvig argument, however, is difficult to make on the facts
of Feist. A Kansas statute mandated that Rural publish its direc-
tory. In addition, it distributed its directory for free. The argument
that Rural needed a copyright monopoly to stimulate the creation
of its directory is almost impossible to make.
Note we have discussed whether Miller, Toksvig, and Feist are
consistent with the constitutional mandate "to promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts" without mentioning the originality
requirement or the idea/expression dichotomy. They seem irrele-
vant when conducting a direct inquiry into whether protecting a
particular type of work from a particular type of borrowing is
necessary to promote the public welfare. Unfortunately, Feist frus-
trates Congress from conducting this direct inquiry regarding "un-
original works."
Under the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress is charged to
increase public welfare by providing incentives for creation. Con-
gress might do this in several ways respecting low authorship
works. It might find that: (1) low authorship works in general re-
quire strong incentives for creation and provide broad protection
to labor and research; (2) only certain types of very labor-intensive
and expensive-to-produce works of low authorship require the in-
centive of copyright protection; (3) virtually no protection should
be afforded to labor and research because the cost of such protec-
tion is simply too high; or (4) general guidelines suffice and the
courts should be left to establish the proper balance of incentives
on a case by case basis. According to the Feist, the current copy-
right statute should most closely embody option 3.
As long as Congress is seeking to realize the constitutional man-
date to promote public welfare, then the choice of any of these
four options should be constitutional. The Constitution gives Con-
gress the job of initially performing the cost-benefit analysis inher-
ent in copyright law. Traditionally, congressional fact-finding is
accorded great weight. Congress may or may not succeed in pro-
viding an efficient set of incentives, but in the absence of strong
empirical data to the contrary, who can say it will not? Tinkering
[1991
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with copyright law seems properly left to Congress (who under
option 4 might punt to the courts).
The primary vice of Feist is that it locks Congress into option 3.
The Court could not have made it clearer that the Constitution
forbids protection of labor, research, or industrious collection: in
simple terms, "sweat." Even if Congress identifies works which
would not be created but for the grant of copyright protection,
Congress may not protect them. If Congress determines option 1,
2, or 4 above would maximize the public welfare, Congress may
not act. Rather than permitting Congress to scrutinize the market
and establish protection for works that merit stimulation, the Court
cordoned off a forbidden zone. Looking at the facts of Feist illus-
trates the point. Although probably unlikely, assume that after the
Feist decision some telephone companies stopped producing white
pages directories, and other parties did not fill the void by produc-
ing their own white pages and selling them because such works
were utterly unprotected. Consistent with its constitutional man-
date, Congress might decide to amend the copyright statute to
stimulate the creation of what is clearly a valuable resource. The
Court's finding of a constitutional prohibition in Feist, as opposed
to a statutory prohibition, would prevent Congress from doing
precisely that.
One can find some solace in the fact that many white pages
directories are required by state statute to be produced and distrib-
uted, but many other sorts of valuable low authorship works may
require the carrot of the copyright monopoly. Protecting labor and
sweat requires the protection of facts and information to a certain
degree. The best way to protect the research and labor of Ms.
Toksvig may be to protect some biographic material that is entirely
factual. Sometimes the only way to stimulate investments in labor
and research may be to provide limited protection to the facts and
information thereby produced. The fair use doctrine traditionally
has provided appropriate limitations to avoid the impoverishment
of the public domain.
Would providing protection to the primarily factual fruits of
industrious labor generate wealth or impoverish the public domain?
Who knows? The salient point is that the debate ended prema-
turely. Congress is stymied and may not provide any such protec-
tion even if it has irrefutable evidence that "the Sciences and useful
Arts" would be promoted. In addition, the courts are saddled with
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a definition of originality that seems only negative in conception.
All we know is that sweat and labor do not confer it.
III. THE POST-FEIST TERRAIN
Not all low authorship works are endangered by Feist. Al-
though facts themselves are never protected, an original selection,
coordination, and arrangement of facts can still be copyrighted.
Presumably, the decision in a case like Adventures in Good Eating v
Best Places to Eat74 is still good law. In Good Eating, the plaintiff had
prepared a list of restaurants from around the country. He selected
a discrete group out of the hundreds of thousands available and
provided information on location, menu items, and prices. Such a
work easily demonstrates the modicum of originality as to selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement demanded by Feist. Other
more formulaic works, however, may be in trouble. In the first
appellate decision published after Feist, the Second Circuit held
that a newsletter organizing facts from horse racing results relevant
to the selection of winning numbers in illegal lottery operations
was not entitled to copyright protection. It noted that all other
publishers of such charts used the same format, describing them as
"purely functional grids that offer no opportunity for variation." 
Although the plaintiff "engaged in a certain degree of labor to
compile his charts, his labor [was] irrelevant to the central question
of whether his work displayed some modicum of originality enti-
tling it to copyright protection."76 Obviously, Feist will have an
impact on other works of low authorship as well.
A. LAW REPORTS
The Eight Circuit's decision in West Publishing Co. v Mead Data
Central, Inc.77 is almost certainly a casualty of Feist. In West, the
court held that Mead Data's Lexis computerized legal research ser-
vice could not reference page numbers contained in volumes of
West reporters, other than the first page of a case."8 In other words,
14 131 F2d 809 (7th Cir 1942).
71 Victor Lalli Enter., Inc. v Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F2d 671, 673 (2d Cir 1991).
" Id at 674.
7 799 F2d 1219 (8th Cir 1986).
11 West did not seek to protect the numbers of the initial page of cases it publishes.
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Lexis could not provide "pinpoint" or "jump-cites" to cases pub-
lished by West without its permission. Although the cases them-
selves are not copyrightable,79 the Eight Circuit enjoined Mead
Data's jump-cite service on the basis that it infringed West's copy-
right in the arrangement of its cases."0 The case was vigorously
attacked in an article l which apparently impressed the Feist Court.
Is there anything original about labeling consecutively the pages
of the Feist opinion in volume 111 of the Supreme Court Reporter
from 1282 through 1297? Certainly no more than choosing to fol-
low "Anne Zwerling" by "Mark Zwolak" in my local telephone
white pages.8 2 Perhaps West's arrangement of cases in F2d is copy-
rightable, but that should only prevent Mead Data from putting
out competing reporter volumes with the same arrangement.8 , Its
mere lifting of the fact that a particular set of words rests on a
particular page of a West reporter clearly would seem to be privi-
leged by Feist. Mead borrowed numbers that are ordered in West's
volumes from smallest to largest. Given the Court's finding that
alphabetical arrangement is unprotected, it is hard to see how the
Eighth Circuit's protection of numeric arrangement can survive
Feist.
B. THE YELLOW PAGES
Telephone directory yellow pages present a slightly different
problem than the white pages. They are not merely alphabetized
listings of all the businesses in a particular area. The yellow pages
typically contain advertisements, artwork of various sorts, and
other material arranged alphabetically along with phone numbers
and addresses within particular subject headings. Obviously, a
greater opportunity for original selection, arrangement, and coordi-
nation exists. Most yellow pages would seem to be copyrightable.
79 See Wheaton v Peters, 8 Peters 591 (1834).
o 799 F2d at 1224. Mead has since agreed to pay West tens of millions of dollars to obtain
a license. See Patterson &Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev at 722 n 6 and accompanying text (cited
in note 14).
81 See Patterson & Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev 719 (cited in note 14).
11 Athens, Georgia, Phone Directory at 156 (BellSouth 1990).
83 Federal Reporter (Second) volumes are arranged in roughly chronological order. But
see Boeving v United States, 650 F2d 493 (8th CirJune 17, 1981), which is in between NLRB
v Kiawab Island Co., Ltd, 650 F2d 485 (4th Cir May 27, 1981), and Federal Leasing, Inc. v
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F2d 495 (4th Cir June 2, 1981).
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However, under Feist, copyrightability does not mean full protec-
tion under all circumstances. The Court made it clear that only
selection, arrangement, and coordination are protectable. For ex-
ample, although BellSouth's Athens, Georgia, yellow pages are
copyrightable, the facts contained therein can be used for any pur-
pose. Since "[t]he originality requirement 'rule[s] out protecting...
names, addresses, and telephone numbers,"' only a reproduction
of original elements of yellow pages formatting is prohibited. 4
Several courts have held that a directory publisher may not use
the listings contained in an existing yellow pages to produce a
competing product.8 5 This conclusion now seems highly question-
able. Under Feist, names and addresses are not copyrightable, so
any competitor can feel free to use an existing yellow pages to
compile a list of potential advertisers in its own yellow pages. A
slightly more difficult question involves whether the competing
yellow pages can utilize the same subject headings as the existing
directory. Through the work of the National Yellow Pages Service
Organization, virtually all yellow pages in the United States adhere
to a standardized format. Therefore, the standard format is unpro-
tectable as a practice "firmly rooted in tradition and so common-
place that it has come to be expected as a matter of course." 6 A
final sticking point may arise when a business wishes to use the
same advertisement in both yellow pages. Must the producer of
the competing yellow pages demand that its customers invent new
advertisements for its directory? The answer is probably "no,"
given that the copyright to the advertisement belongs to the busi-
ness and not the producer of the first yellow pages.8 7 Contrary to
prior lower court precedent, Feist clearly sanctions the production
of competing yellow pages as long as the second-comer's product
does not substantially reproduce the individual page-by-page ar-
rangements of materials found in the first (something only likely
to result from photocopying).
84 See Feist, 111 S Ct at 1296, citing Patterson & Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev at 776 (cited in
note 14).
85 See BellSouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v Donnelly Information Pub., Inc., 933 F2d 952
(1th Cir 1991).
86 Feist, 111 S Ct at 1297.
87 See 17 USC § 201(b).
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C. MAPS
The most troubling victim of the Feist opinion may be the map-
making industry. Cartographers typically expend painstaking time,
energy, and expense in making accurate representations of parcels
of terrain. When their surveys are finished, their ability to recoup
their investment is enhanced by the power to exclude unauthorized
copying. However, this merely suggests that we might increase
public welfare by affording copyright protection to maps; it does
not tell us that a map is original under Feist.
Unfortunately for modern-day Amerigo Vespuccis, the map is
one of the least original works protected by pre-Feist copyright law.
Although a great deal of expense, labor, and sweat go into creating
a map, a good map is usually not original. Its subject matter is
certainly not a creation of its author, and its formatting is usually
dictated by standard mapmaking conventions. One can imagine
maps that might be original; for example, the famous humorous
rendition of the map of the world as seen by New Yorkers, con-
sisting 90 percent of oversized images of New York City with tiny
figures labeled "Texas" and "Pacific Ocean" in the far background.
Or perhaps a map that listed streets as "Puddings" and schools as
"Grapefruit" might be original. Maybe the choice to include certain
street names or use a particular scale or typeface might consist of
a sort of originality as to selection. But once selection is made,
arrangement and coordination are completely dictated by physical
reality.
The most endangered map is probably the most useful: the tech-
nical survey plat. These maps are carefully produced in a standard-
ized manner sometimes dictated by law.88 Before Feist, the Seventh
Circuit recently confirmed the copyrightability of plat maps. 89
That decision may also be on our endangered list, although it
hardly seems conceivable that the Court would completely deny
protection to a type of work mentioned specifically by Congress in
1790 as being one of the three objects of the first copyright act. In
fact, given the presence of some of the framers of the Constitution
in that first Congress, the conclusions reached in Feist regarding the
availability of sweat-based copyright protection seem even more
suspect.
88 See, for example, OCGA § 15-6-67 (1990).
89 See Rockford Map Publishers Inc. v Directory Serv. Co., 768 F2d 145 (7th Cir 1985).
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D. NEW USES FOR EXISTING DATA
Given that Feist protects only the selection, arrangement, and
coordination of low authorship works, it seems generally to autho-
rize the incorporation of existing data in dissimilar works. For ex-
ample, in National Business Lists, Inc. v Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. °
("NBL") the court enjoined a creator of business mailing lists from
using information copied from Dun & Bradstreet credit reports.
The information taken from Dun & Bradstreet was entirely factual.
The mailing list compiler did not produce competing business
credit reports-it created a different product with a different pur-
pose. When factual information is used to create a work that lacks
substantial similarity to a prior work, then the selection, arrange-
ment, and coordination have not been copied. In a case like NBL,
Feist would seem to permit the copying because "[t]he originality
requirement 'rule[s] out protecting ... names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers of which the plaintiff by no stretch of the imagina-
tion could be called the author.'"91
E. LIVE BROADCASTS
One of the most surprising casualties of Feist may by the copy-
right currently afforded certain live television and radio broadcasts.
Under sections 101 and 102 of the Copyright Act, broadcasters of
live events on television and radio receive a copyright on the broad-
cast that permits them to prevent unauthorized taping, simultane-
ous broadcasting, or taped rebroadcasting of the event. For exam-
ple, the Seventh Circuit has held that Major League Baseball owns
the copyright to broadcasts of professional baseball games. 92 This
is somewhat curious given that the games themselves (as opposed
to the broadcasts) are clearly not copyrightable, not because they
are not original, but because they are not authored. 93 A contrast
with ballet is instructive on this point. A ballet is scripted before
it is performed-the movements of the dancers are planned in
' 552 F Supp 89 (ND Ill 1982).
9' Feist, II1 S Ct at 1296, quoting Patterson & Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev at 776 (cited in
note 14).
92 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 805 F2d 663 (7th Cir 1986).
93 See I Nimmer §§ 108[c][21 at 1-49 to 1-54 & 209[f] at 2-138 to 2-138.6 (cited in note
5).
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advance94 and painstakingly rehearsed. A choreographer may
therefore obtain a copyright in an original work of dance.9 It is
truly a work of authorship as demanded by the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause.
Consider, however, a typical baseball game. No one knows what
will happen next. No single author or group of authors is orches-
trating, planning, or scripting the game. It may be original, but it
is not authored. Something different happens every game. Will the
pitcher strike out the lead-off hitter or will the batter hit a home
run? How many pitches will he foul off?. If he gets a base hit, will
he steal a base? Given the proper conditions, a baseball game is
not unlike a thunderstorm: it just happens. Therefore, both events
are uncopyrightable. Under the current statute, however, the elec-
tronic broadcasts of both a baseball game and a thunderstorm are
copyrightable merely by the fact of their transmission over the
airwaves. The legislative history indicates that Congress thought
that some broadcasting was original enough to confer copyright
protection even when the underlying work was uncopyrightable
due to lack of authorship:
96
When a football game is being covered by four television cam-
eras, with a director guiding the activities of the four camera-
men and choosing which of their electronic images are sent to
the public and in which order, there is no doubt that what the
cameramen and the director are doing constitutes authorship.
This rationale seems to comport with Feist's emphasis on original-
ity in selection, arrangement, and coordination when the underly-
ing materials are uncopyrightable works. Although the underlying
game is uncopyrightable (as are facts in compilations), some ele-
ments of the broadcast may be sufficiently original to merit a copy-
right.
This rationale explains why the broadcasting of an entire game
may well pass constitutional muster, but at the same time it casts
doubt on whether bits and pieces of games, like individual facts in
a compilation, are protected. The originality requirement of Feist
may well provide for more leeway in the borrowing of unoriginal
94 I suppose with the exception of some totally freeform modem dancing.
95 See Horgan v Macmillan, Inc. 621 F Supp 1169 (SDNY 1985) (George Balanchine
production of "The Nutcracker" copyrightable).
I HR Rep No 94-781 at 52, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1981).
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individual clips of athletic performance without the broadcaster's
permission-for example, a clip of Nolan Ryan striking out his
4,000 batter taken entirely from the standard behind-the-plate cam-
era location. Much more seriously endangered are cases affording
broad protection to television news broadcasts. 97
Take, for example, typical nightly newsfare: a live speech by a
candidate for political office. Normally there will be no coordina-
tion of cameras, no real choices as to where to point the camera,
no arrangement of images to consider. The task of the cameraman
is to stand in the back of the room and transmit images. The
event is purely factual; therefore, under Feist, only originality as to
selection, coordination, and arrangement of the broadcast speech
is entitled to protection. Many televised speeches and interviews
presumably lack the requisite originality. Unlike broadcasts of
some athletic events, the goal of a televised speech or interview is
not originality, but mere transmission of facts. This is not to say
that television stations should not be rewarded for the enormous
effort and expense entailed in broadcasting the news. This section
simply notes that Feist makes it clear that originality and not effort
is the constitutional prerequisite for protection.
In rejecting the sweat of the brow doctrine, the Court noted its
historical refusal to allow the news of the day to be copyrighted. 98
This suggests a hostility to the notion that standard and pedestrian
broadcasting of a speech or interview should be protected absent
the sort of originality as to selection, arrangement, and coordina-
tion described above in reference to the filming of some sporting
events. Originality must be the public's reward when protection
renders news of the day less available. Surely, some live news
broadcasting meets the low threshold established by the Court.
Equally surely much does not. The sort of protection afforded
any broadcast of television news interviews and speeches by the
Eleventh Circuit in Paciflc and Southern Co. v Duncan99 certainly is
overbroad.
-97 See Pacific and Soutbern Co., Inc. v Duncan, 792 F2d 1013 (11th Cir 1986) (affirming
permanent injunction against the taping of WXIA newscasts).
98 111 S Ct at 1292, citing International News Serv. v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234
(1918). Ironically, the Court in INS did provide limited protection to news of the day by
finding a proprietary interest worthy of short-term protection under pre-Erie federal law of
unfair competition.
9 792 F2d 1013 (11th Cir 1986).
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In Pacific and Southern, the court affirmed an injunction against a
service that copied news broadcasts and sold tapes to the subjects
of the broadcasts. It held, "Television interviews with or speeches
by public officials, for example, seem to us . . . likely to qualify
as the work of WXIA staff-who make audio, filming and editing
choices in the presentation of this material.""' Although the court's
focus on "choices" seems well placed, it granted complete protec-
tion to all past and future news broadcasts without regard to the
"choices" it thought the station would make (analyzing past broad-
casts would have been impossible because the plaintiff television
station routinely destroyed all its tapes within seven days after they
were made). The court's permanent injunction as to future copying
can only be read to establish a per se copyright to WXIA's broad-
casts without proof of originality.
F. COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Feist's implications for the computer industry are largely beyond
the scope of this article. However, the decision does add some
ammunition to those who attack the copyrightability of screen dis-
plays that are dictated primarily by function.1"' The alphabetical
listing of the telephone white pages in Feist was unoriginal in large
part because it was "practically inevitable."'02 This same argument
against the protection of computer screen displays has arisen in
cases such as Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Intern.10 3
The content of many screen displays is dictated by function rather
than the imagination of the programmer. Feist suggests that when-
ever the choices made by a programmer are "inevitable," the consti-
tutionally required modicum of originality may very well be
absent.
Although the impact of Feist is difficult to predict, case law pro-
tecting law report pagination, telephone yellow pages, and existing
data from new uses appears to be jeopardized. Broadcasters and
computer programmers may also find that standard, routine, or
110 Id at 1014 n. 1.
101 Comment, Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software International: Broad Copyright
Protection for User Interfaces Ignores the Software Industry's Trend toward Standardization, 52 U
Pitt L Rev 689 (1991).
10' 111 S Ct at 1297.
,01 740 F Supp 37 (D Mass 1990).
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inevitable aspects of their works have entered the public domain.
In theory, the most endangered class of creations should be maps;
however, it would be surprising to find courts stripping protection
away from one of the recipients of the original 1790 copyright
grant. Finally, even when works of low authorship are entitled to
a copyright, the protection extends only to selection, arrangement,
and coordination. This narrow scope of protection may often pre-
vent little more than photocopying or verbatim transcription.
IV. ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO CONGRESS
Although Feist constitutionalizes the originality require-
ment, Congress may have several options if it finds Feist's regime
overly restrictive.
A. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The opinion in Feist makes it clear that the Intellectual Property
Clause does not authorize Congress to protect works of low author-
ship under a sweat of the brow rationale. Whether the opinion
prevents Congress from providing protection under its general
power to regulate interstate commerce1" is a difficult question.
Representatives of the publishing industry have urged Congress to
overrule Feist before its own ink dried. If Congress chooses to
respond, it could attempt to negate Feist on its facts by passing a
law forbidding the copying of telephone white pages, or it could
enact a broader unfair competition statute prohibiting the copying
of any "industrious collection."
No cases have expressly held that Congress can resort to the
Commerce Clause to evade limitations present in the Intellectual
Property Clause. 105 Such a question would have presented itself in
another context, if, for example, Congress had ever attempted to
use the Commerce Clause to justify the grant of an eternal patent.
The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to promote
science by granting monopoly rights to inventors "for limited
times." A law granting an eternal patent would clearly contravene
"0i US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3.
105 See 1 Nimmer § 1.09 at 1-60 (cited in note 5) ("no judicial or legislative authority exists
for this proposition").
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the express language of the clause. According to Feist, a law pro-
tecting the white pages or any other "unoriginal" writings would
directly contravene the implicit language of the clause.
This interpretation suggests that section 8 of Article I does more
than grant Congress a laundry list of powers-it also places sub-
stantive limitations on Congress. This interpretation is plausible
on the face of section 8, which contains several other express limita-
tions on the federal legislative power. For example, the first clause
of section 8 grants Congress the power to levy taxes, but requires
that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States." Clause 4 establishes congressional power to
enact bankruptcy laws, provided they are "uniform." Clause 12
authorizes Congress to raise armies, but provides that "no appropri-
ation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
years." Similarly, clause 17 provides for the creation of the District
of Columbia in a size "not exceeding ten Miles square." Such limi-
tations on Article I power recently were illustrated-at least
nominally-by the Court's decision in Railway Executors Ass'n v
Gibbons,' 6 holding that the substantive limitation against nonuni-
form bankruptcy laws could not be overridden under the general
commerce power.
We should recognize, however, that the limitations in clauses 1,
12, and 17 seem further removed from the Commerce Clause than
the Intellectual Property or Bankruptcy Clauses. Although we
might imagine Congress enacting legislation providing for nonuni-
form duties and taxes in order to regulate interstate commerce in
some way (thereby conflicting with clause 1) or annexing an extra
square mile of Maryland in order to build a new headquarters for
the ICC (thereby conflicting with clause 17), an attempt to protect
the telephone white pages is arguably closer to the core of the
commerce power. Congress' bankruptcy power contained in clause
4 similarly seems to overlap its power to regulate commerce. Not
surprisingly, then, the interrelation, of the Bankruptcy and Com-
merce Clauses canvassed by the Court in Gibbons provides clear
guidance in evaluating the Intellectual Property Clause/Commerce
Clause conflict that would arise from the enactment of a statute
purporting to overrideFeist. The Intellectual Property/Commerce
106 455 US 457 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169 1991
170 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Clause problem, however, was partially addressed by the Court in
the Trade-Mark Cases, 10 7 where we should first turn.
In 1870, Congress passed the first law providing for the federal
registration of trademarks. Although the law purported to find its
basis in the Intellectual Property Clause,' the Court held that the
clause did not authorize the statute. In response to the argument
that the Commerce Clause could serve as an alternative basis for
the legislation, the Court found fault with the wording of the stat-
ute which was interpreted to provide for registration of trademarks
whose use was wholly intrastate. However, the Court strongly
suggested that the Commerce Clause could properly authorize the
registration of marks used in interstate commerce.'°9 Because of
this suggestion, the case arguably stands for the broad proposition
that Congress may do under the Commerce Clause what it may
not do under the Intellectual Property Clause.
Because such a reading of the case would nullify the substantive
limitations contained in the Intellectual Property Clause, closer
reading of the decision is warranted. Of particular importance is
why a statute providing for the federal registration of trademarks
failed as a matter of Congress' power to grant copyrights. As dis-
cussed earlier, 110 the Court in the Trade-Mark Cases adhered to tradi-
tional notions of what constitutes a trademark. Under the tradi-
tional view, a trademark does nothing more than embody the good
will of a business: "Good will and its symbol, a trademark, are
inseparable. A trademark has no independent significance apart
from the good will it symbolizes. If there is no business and no
good will, a trademark symbolizes nothing."1" This understanding
107 100 US 82 (1879).
108 Id at 92. See 16 Stat 198 (1870) ("An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes
relating to patents and copyrights.").
109 Id at 95-99. Of course, the Lanham Act, 15 USC §§ 1051 et seq., which currently
provides for the federal registration, is based on the Commerce Clause. See, for example,
J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:15 at 270 (1984); Purolator,
Inc. v Efra Dist., 687 F2d 554 (1st Cir 1982). The Court has never directly confronted the
constitutionality of the Lanham Act, but it has presumed it in a number of recent cases.
See San Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. v United States Olympic Committee, 483 US 522 (1987);
Park 'NFly, Inc. v DdllarPark & Fly, Inc., 469 US 189 (1985). It cannot be seriously doubted
that the commerce power extends to the protection of trademarks.
"10 See text accompanying notes 24-29 above.
... McCarthy, 1 Trademarks § 2.8 at 76 (cited in note 109). See also Comment, Money
Damages and Corrective Advertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U Chi L Rev 629, 642-58 (1988)
(discussing the economic value of good will and function of trademarks); Trade-Mark Cases,
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of the function of trademark law explains the Court's holding that
a trademark cannot be "original." In layman's terms, a trademark
often is original. Many trademarks are new and different-the re-
sult of hours of creative labor. However, according to the Court,
the value of a trademark is a result of its use and not its design.
Even if a trademark is attractive and artistic, its merit cannot be
separated from. consumer perceptions of the business or product it
serves to identify. The purpose of trademark law is to protect the
integrity of that perception by preventing confusing uses of similar
trademarks.
Imagine "Mona Lisa" beer, the product of a micro-brewery that
utilizes a picture of the Mona Lisa as its trademark. Under the
Trade-Mark Cases, Congress may find in the Intellectual Property
Clause the power to grant Da Vinci (if he were still alive) a copy-
right for his painting. Congress clearly advances the arts by provid-
ing such protection. However, if Congress provides protection for
the use of the Mona Lisa as a trademark on a bottle of beer, it is
advancing a different interest. Federal registration of the Mona
Lisa beer trademark will help protect the trademark owner and
consumers from competitors wishing to capitalize on the Mona Lisa
Company's good will by selling an inferior product under the Mona
Lisa label. Trademark law protects the ability of a consumer to
identify products and also provides incentives for the creation of
higher quality products.112 Although trademark law, like copyright
and patent, is concerned with economic efficiency and the creation
of wealth, it does not accomplish its goals by advancing "Science
and Useful Arts." Therefore, the Intellectual Property Clause does
not authorize the protection of a trademark no matter how new,
different, elaborate, or artistic it may be. When the Court said a
trademark is not "original," therefore, it meant that the values pro-
tected by trademark law are not "the fruits of intellectual labor...
depend[ing] upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of
the brain. 113 Trademark law does not protect creativity per se, but
100 US at 93-94. For the minority contrary position, see Frank Schecter, The Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection (1927) (some trademarks may be so distinctive that they are valuable
even before they are used and good will can attach). Cf Misbawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co. v S. S. Kresge Co., 316 US 203 (1942) (discussing the psychological attraction of some
distinctive marks).
"I Why incur the increased cost of creating a high quality product if the competition can
produce an inferior version and attract consumers by using the same trademark?
.. 100 US at 94.
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rather consumer perceptions and quality incentives. Since creativ-
ity is at the heart of copyright protection, trademark protection
rightfully falls outside its ambit.
The crucial question, however, is whether the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause contains an express limitation on the protection of
trademarks that should prevent their protection under the Com-
merce Clause. Such a limitation is difficult to find. As noted above,
the Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by granting limited and
exclusive rights to creators. Given the Court's understanding of
trademark law, the limitations inherent in that authorization seem
inapposite. Trademark law does not hinder the progress of the Arts
and Sciences, nor does it grant rights to authors. It merely protects
convenient source identification devices, as evidenced by the fact
that nonconfusing uses of another's trademark are not actionable
under federal law. Use of the Commerce Clause to authorize the
protection of trademarks would not seem to conflict with the lan-
guage, goals, or purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause."1 4
Legislation protecting telephone white pages or other works of
low authorship under the Commerce Clause poses more serious
difficulties because the Court made it clear in Feist that such protec-
tion would directly conflict with the purpose of the Intellectual
Property Clause. According to the Court, the clause not only tells
us what may be protected, but what must remain in the public
domain. The progress of the arts and sciences would be impeded
if a healthy public domain were not maintained. The primary in-
habitants of that domain are facts and ideas that may be copied at
will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate-it is the means
by which copyright advances the progress of science and art. 1 To
that end, the Court labels as a "constitutional requirement" that
"much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others
without compensation."116 The Court sees, although perhaps incor-
rectly, that the protection of works such as the white pages would
"' This formulation sounds a bit like preemption analysis. In a sense, the Constitution
limits (preempts) congressional action in the same way that congressional action can preempt
state action. There is a presumption against both sorts of limitations, and the key is finding
a frustration of purpose or a direct conflict in goals.
1111 S Ct at 1289-90.
116 Id.
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frustrate the goals of the Intellectual Property Clause by diminish-
ing the raw materials available for others' creations.
Given the Court's recognition of the danger of protection, it
seems unlikely it would permit its perception of the framer's vision
of the public domain to be circumvented. Unlike trademark law,
a statute providing protection for industrious collections that flunk
Feist's originality test would seem to run directly counter to the
goals of the Intellectual Property Clause as defined by the Court.
Some support for this proposition may be gleaned from a surpris-
ing source, the Bankruptcy Clause. In 1980, Congress attempted
to protect the employees of the bankrupt Rock Island railroad by
authorizing payments to them out of the railroad's estate in bank-
ruptcy. Since the law applied only to the Rock Island estate, and
not to other railroad bankruptcies, it was not "uniform" as man-
dated by the Bankruptcy Clause. In Railway Labor Executors Assn v
Gibbons,117 the Court considered whether Congress could enact this
nonuniform bankruptcy legislation under the Commerce Clause.
A unanimous Court answered negatively: "if we were to hold that
Congress had the power to enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bank-
ruptcy laws."118
In Feist the Court similarly held that the originality requirement
was a limitation on Congress' power to enact copyright legislation.
Gibbons provides strong support for the proposition that Congress
may not circumvent that limitation through the Commerce Clause
despite the implications of the Trade-Mark Cases discussed above.
The same rationale that prevents Congress from enacting nonuni-
form bankruptcy laws should prevent it from enacting laws pro-
tecting unoriginal creations.
The history of the Intellectual Property Clause sheds additional
light on the propriety of the Court's insistence that it functions as
not only a grant of power but a strong substantive limitation. The
language of the clause is almost certainly borrowed from the Stat-
ute of Anne," 9 which was enacted in response to problems which
"' 455 US 457 (1982). See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-CreatedRights:
The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 Supreme Court Review 25.
... Gibbons, 455 US at 468-69.
" 8 Anne ch 21 (1710). See generally L. Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyrigbt
Misconstrued, 3 Harv J Leg 223 (1966).
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arose during the pendency of the copyright monopoly enjoyed by
the London Stationer's Company. The Stationer's copyright "was
used as an instrument of both monopoly and press control until
the last of the English censorship acts."' 2 ° The Statute of Anne
"was designed to ensure that the statutory copyright would be used
for neither purpose.'. 21 The Statute of Anne led to the end of
the Stationer's monopoly, helped increase the public domain, and
enhanced the free flow of information.
This lesson was not lost on the framers of the Constitution. They
worded the Intellectual Property Clause to prevent abuses like
those perpetrated when the Stationer's Company exercised com-
plete control over publishing in England. According to the clause,
only authors may be granted a copyright, only for a limited time,
and only for original works. Most importantly, the copyright law
should promote the progress of science, which in the eighteenth
century sense meant "knowledge."'22 This progress is meant to
benefit the public as a whole, and the Court has often spoken in
economic terms to describe the benefit: "The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare."' 123 The
rationale for copyright protection fails without "public access to
the products of [authors'] genius."'124 Public access "is the means
by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.'
125
Therefore, the clause can properly be seen to tie Congress' hands
to a certain extent. The systematic grant of monopoly rights should
be designed to ensure the public welfare, not profit the few at the
expense of the many. History indicates that any use of the Com-
merce Clause to subvert that end should be rebuffed. This is not
to say that the Court is correct in its assertion that the sweat of the
brow rationale inevitably diminishes public wealth. Strong argu-
ments can be made that the Court has made a grave mistake in
holding the rationale unconstitutional. However, once the Court
120 Patterson & Joyce, 36 UCLA L Rev at 785 (cited in note 14).
121 Id.
122 See Ginsburg, 90 Colum L Rev at 1876 (cited in note 31).
123 Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954).
124 Sony Corp. v Universal Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 429 (1984).
125 Feit, 111 S Ct at 1290.
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finds that the Intellectual Property Clause forbids the protection
of works under a sweat of the brow rationale, Congress cannot
avoid the holding by resorting to the Commerce Clause. History
demonstrates that Congress does not have carte blanche-in order
to promote the public welfare, the Intellectual Property Clause
tells Congress what it may not do.
B. DIRECT SUBSIDIES
In New Energy Co. of Indiana v Limbach,'26 the Court considered
an incentive taxation scheme enacted by Indiana to encourage its
budding ethanol industry, and struck down the Indiana law as
discriminating against interstate commerce in violation of the Com-
merce Clause. However, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
noted that direct subsidies of the state's ethanol producers would
not be unconstitutional. Although Limbach deals with the question
of what states may do under the Constitution, its reasoning may
be applicable to how Congress can respond to Feist. Rather than
enacting a potentially unconstitutional statute granting monopoly
rights to producers of telephone white pages, Congress might
choose to subsidize their production if it determined such a subsidy
would be necessary to ensure their continued existence. Given that
many telephone companies are required by state law to compile
and publish alphabetical lists of their subscribers, such a subsidy
program would not seem necessary in the case of telephone white
pages. However, it might be necessary to ensure the production of
other valuable works of low authorship.
The suggestion-that subsidizing works ineligible for copyright
protection would be constitutional-may seem somewhat paradox-
ical. However, the Court has never taken an active role in policing
congressional action taken under the spending clause. Congress
subsidizes numerous sorts of production through its power of the
purse. The Intellectual Property Clause should only be implicated
when Congress acts through the grant of monopoly power.
C. CIRCUMVENTION OF FEIST BY THE STATES
Although Congress is powerless to protect "unoriginal" works,
the possibility of a response to Feist by the states remains. Since
126 486 US 269 (1988).
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the limitations present in the Intellectual Property Clause are found
in the enumeration of powers of the federal Congress in Article I,
the states could plausibly argue that they are free to provide a
different scope of protection for "unoriginal" works. This issue,
however, is unlikely ever to arise. Since the Copyright Act itself
contains an originality requirement, under Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thun-
der Craft Boats, Inc. 127 any state law protecting unoriginal creations
would be preempted as conflicting with the goals and purposes of
the Act's originality requirement. In Bonito Boats, the Court struck
down a Florida statute prohibiting the duplication of boat hulls
by any direct molding process. The Florida statute frustrated the
purpose of federal patent law because it provided protection with-
out requiring satisfaction of any of the qualitative criteria (novelty,
nonobviousness, or usefulness) present in the patent law. Similarly,
a state law protecting unoriginal creations would run afoul of the
originality criteria contained in the Copyright Act.
This analysis, however, does not apply to all types of creations,
only those categorized in sections 102 and 103 of the Act. 128 In
Goldstein v California,129 which was cited with approval in Bonito
Boats, the Court held that states may protect categories of works
(in that case sound recordings before they were protected under
the Act) left unregulated by Congress. For example, although a
state may not protect an unoriginal literary work, piece of music,
or compilation, it may protect something like a right of publicity
which Congress has not yet made a category of work eligible for
protection. So, an unoriginal work of a type not yet categorized in
sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act might be amenable to
protection by the states. Given the difficulty of imagining such a
work, it seems safe to say generally that state attempts to circum-
vent Feist will be futile.
V. CONCLUSION
Before Feist was decided, a sophisticated scholarly debate
raged about the need to protect low authorship works. Although
127 489 US 141 (1989). See generally John S. Wiley Jr., Bonito Boats: Uninformed But
Mandatory Innovation Policy, 1989 Supreme Court Review 283.
"I Listing literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes, choreographic
works, motion pictures, sound recordings, compilations, and pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works.
29 412 US 546 (1973).
[1991
HeinOnline -- 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 176 1991
THE VICES OF ORIGINALITY 177
no agreement was reached on the contours of the necessary protec-
tion, a general consensus found that valuable works of low author-
ship should be protected if they would otherwise go uncreated.
The debate focused on the proper balance of incentives necessary
to increase public wealth. Originality was recognized to be a term
of art: works worth protecting were original; those not needing
protection were not. As the opinion recognizes, telephone directory
white pages are almost certainly not worth protecting from the sort
of activity engaged in by Feist. However, other works that are
the product of perspiration rather than inspiration might be. The
primary vice of Feist is its broad language forbidding Congress from
protecting any sweat of the brow works or industrious collections
in the future. This flaw is especially glaring given that copyright
law as currently enacted clearly does not provide for such protec-
tion, and therefore the decision could have rested on purely statu-
tory grounds.
The potential effect of Feist may well be far-reaching. Its particu-
lar definition of originality casts doubt on the copyrightability of
maps, systems, lists, tables, historical works and research, and
pagination of law reports. Perhaps the most interesting question
left after Feist is not what works will be cast to the public domain,
but whether Congress can constitutionally overrule the decision.
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